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INADMISSIBILITY OF WIRETAP
EVIDENCE IN STATE COURTS
The Supreme Court, in Lee v. Florida,' extended its interpretation
of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act2 to render
conversations intercepted and divulged in violation of the Act
inadmissible as evidence in a state court.' Two days after the decision
in Lee, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19681
became law. The Act rewrote section 605 and added a new chapter to
the U.S. Code defining the areas and establishing the procedures for
permissible wiretapping.' Lee and the cases which preceded it,' along
with the Crime Control Act, comprise the foundation for future
developments in the wiretapping area.
Lee ordered a private telephone installed in his house but was able
to obtain only a four-party line. Thereafter, the Orlando city police
had a phone in a neighboring house connected to the same party line
and installed equipment enabling them to hear and record all
conversations on the party line. The device was used on calls to and
from Lee's residence for more than a week. Lee and two others were
convicted of violating the state lottery laws at a trial in which the
recorded conversations were admitted in evidence over objection.
After the convictions were affirmed by a Florida district court of
appeal,7 and the Supreme Court of Florida denied further review,8 the
United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions on a writ of
certiorari. 9
The problem of wiretapping was first considered by the Supreme
Court in Olmstead v. United States0 at a time when no federal
legislation covered the subject. In Olmstead, the Court held that
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evidence obtained by a wiretap in violation of a state statute was
admissible, reasoning that telephone conversations were not subject to
the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure." Since the enactment of section 605 in 1934, the Supreme
Court has been continually called upon to determine what Congress
intended in enacting the statute. In Nardone v. United States2 the
Court interpreted section 605 as being comprehensive in its coverage,
excluding from the federal courts all evidence obtained by federal
officers in violation of the section. Concluding that Congress had not
intended to exempt federal officers from the Act, the Court strictly
applied the prohibitive terms of section 605.' 3 Subsequently, in
Schwartz v. Texas 4 the Court ruled that the section 605 prohibitions
were not based upon constitutional grounds, and that state courts
could admit conversations seized in violation of section 605 which, if
seized by federal officers, would be inadmissible in federal courts. 5
Noting the penal sanctions of the Federal Communications Act 6 and
the view that traditional state regulation should not be supplanted
unless the federal statute clearly so provides,' 7 the Court held that a
"rule of evidence" would not be imposed on the states. The more
recent case of Benanti v. United States,9 however, held that evidence
seized in violation of section 605 was inadmissible in a federal court
even if seized solely by state officers.20 Furthermore, in 1967 the Court
interjected the constitutional guarantees of the fourth amendment into
the eavesdropping and wiretapping area with the Berger v. New
York2' and Katz v. United States22 decisions. Berger held
"Id. at 464-65.
2 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
"Id. at 382-83; cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 339 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920). See also Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S.
321, 329 (1939).
"344 U.S. 199 (1952).
I Id. at 201-03.
1647 U.S.C. § 501 (1964).
" See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
466-68 (1927); cf Kansas City S. Ry. v. Leslie, 112 Ark. 305, 329, 167 S.W. 83,92 (1914), rev'd
on other grounds, 238 U.S. 599 (1915).
"1344 U.S. at 203.
19 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
10 Id. at 100; cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). But cf Ferguson v. United
States, 307 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1962).
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unconstitutional a New York statute authorizing eavesdropping or
wiretapping under court order on the grounds that the statute was
overly broad, the Court setting forth specific guidelines for a valid
"seizure" of words3 While not arising under section 605, Berger was
the first case finding evidence obtained by eavesdropping in violation
of the fourth amendment to be inadmissible in state courts. The Katz
case emphasized that the fourth amendment primarily guarantees the
privacy of people rather than places and indicated that with proper
limitations a court order could be granted for eavesdropping which
would not be constitutionally defective.14
In Lee the Court did not reach the constitutional questions
considered in Berger and Katz,25 but rather treated the question as one
of statutory construction involving interpretation of congressional
intent. While noting that persons using party lines should be aware
that they may be overheard, the Court found continuous and
deliberate electronic surveillance of the line to be an "interception" of
communications within the meaning of section 605.26 Effectively
overruling the Schwartz v. Texas position that federally proscribed
interceptions were admissible in state prosecutions, the Court
excluded the recorded conversations of Lee from the Florida
proceeding. The holding was based upon both Mapp v. Ohio,27 which
imposed an exclusionary rule on the states to ensure that state
evidentiary rules did not interfere with federal rights, and on the
proposition of Elkins v. United States8 that no court, state or federal,
should take part in a violation of federal law. Thus the Court extended
section 605 to the states, not only to determine that the conduct of the
officers was proscribed, but also to disallow use of the intercepted
conversations in a state criminal proceeding. The Court emphasized
that the only effective way to achieve adherence to federal law is to
remove the incentive to violate it by mandatory exclusion of the fruits
of the violation. The dissenters in Lee, however, viewed Mapp v.
23 388 U.S. at 44, 53-60.
24 389 U.S. at 351, 354. See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,300-10 (1967).
392 U.S. at 379 n.2.
26Id. at 381-82; cf Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); United States v. Dote,
371 F.2d 176, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1966).
27 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23364 U.S. 206 (1960). See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437-40 (1963); On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754-56 (1952).
29392 U.S. at 386-87; accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); cf Pugach v.
Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 458 (1961). But cf United
1010 [Vol. 1968: 1008
WIRETAP EVIDENCE
Ohio as requiring exclusion only for constitutional violations, and
therefore not applicable in considering the Federal Communications
Act. They asserted that in dealing with a federal statute's application
to the states, a definite statement of intent to exclude evidence from
state proceedings should be made by Congress.
The Crime Control Act establishes congressional policy in many
areas which were previously covered only by Supreme Court
interpretation, thus clarifying the extent to which Congress desires to
limit wiretapping. Primary regulation of wiretapping is placed in a
new chapter of the U.S. Code,3 while section 605, as rewritten, is
principally concerned with communications personnel. 2 Wiretapping
is absolutely prohibited except in specific cases.3 Interception alone
is enough to constitute a violation, and interception is defined to in-
clude aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communi-
cation,34 apparently indicating congressional intent to adhere to the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Katz that the privacy of the
communication itself must be protected, not merely the means of
communication.35 The Act provides that communications intercepted
in violation of the new chapter are inadmissible in evidence in any
federal or state criminal, civil or administrative proceeding.36 Since
the new section 605 is directed solely at the conduct of
communications personnel, rather than wiretapping in general, Lee
will probably be the last important case to interpret the section, and
litigation in this area should be greatly reduced.
The Crime Control Act authorizes wiretapping in several specific
instances. The President may allow it for national security;
communications personnel may make interceptions incident to the
proper performance of their duties which would otherwise be
proscribed; and law enforcement officials may legally tap if they
obtain a court order. 7 The procedural steps written into the law
States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.
1941).
'1 392 U.S. at 387-88 (Black, J., & Harlan, J., dissenting respectively). In fact, Congressional
intent to exclude illegally obtained evidence was to some degree manifested in consideration of
the Crime Control Act before Lee was argued. See 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1971.
11 82 Stat. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1512-25).
32 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1525-26).
33 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2516 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1513, 1517).
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2510(4) (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1513, 1512); cf.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1961).
" See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
3 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1517).
37 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2516-18 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1513-14, 1517-24).
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attempt to follow the guidelines set forth in Berger and Katz for
constitutionally acceptable wiretapping." Thus, an official must apply
to a judge, stating the place, facilities and type of communications
desired to be tapped, as well as the identity of the person and the type
of offense of which he is suspected. Upon a determination of probable
cause and necessity, a judge may issue an order specifying who will do
the interception, the location and type of facilities for which the
interception is authorized, whether or not the interception is to cease
when the desired communication is first obtained, and the time limit
which may be no longer than thirty days. After the end of the time
period, notice must be given to the persons named in the order
informing them of the order and whether or not communications were
intercepted. 9
The new code sections prohibiting interception and proscribing
admission in evidence of communications intercepted in violation of
the chapter 0 indicate that the desires of Congress and the rulings of
the Supreme Court are in harmony in these areas. The decision in Lee,
extending the exclusionary rule to the states, demonstrates that the
majority of the Court either correctly divined Congress' intent in the
original section 605 or anticipated the new provisions. The sections
which authorize interception under court order,4 however, may not
yet reflect the strict drafting necessary to comply with the Berger
guidelines. Berger stressed that indiscriminate or general
eavesdropping could not be allowed, 4 and in Katz 43 and Osborn v.
United States," the Court emphasized that no innocent conversations
were overheard. However, the Crime Control Act would allow
interception of all conversations on particular facilities for so long as
a month,45 thus perhaps permitting a general search. A constitutional
problem may also arise from the provision that the required notice
need not state exactly what was intercepted, 4 since Berger criticized
See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97-105 (1968).
3118 U.S.C. § 2518 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1519-23).
40 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2515 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1513, 1517).
4118 U.S.C. §§ 2516-18 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1517-24).
388 U.S. at 57-59; cf. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). See notes 21 & 38
supra.
41389 U.S. at 354. See notes 22 & 38 supra.
"385 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966).
45 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1519).
"6Id.
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the New York statute for failing to require a return47 and Katz
condemned the government's activity because the agents were not
required to "notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had
been seized. '48 Another possible problem exists because the new
chapter defines an "aggrieved person" as a party to an intercepted
communication or one against whom the interception was directed 9
and allows only such a person to move to suppress the communication
if improperly seized." Thus, a third person may be adversely affected
or incriminated by unlawfully seized communications and yet have no
standing to object,5 ' even though the chapter plainly states that no
such communication will be admissible. Since Congress intends to
severely limit wiretapping, the exclusion of evidence seized improperly
is a necessary method of achieving this end. If police are able to use
improperly intercepted communications against persons who have no
standing to object, the Court may follow the position set forth in
Elkins52 and reaffirmed in Lee" that a procedure which subverts the
clear intent of Congress will not be allowed, extending this principle to
the standing area. The Crime Control Act and the Lee decision
indicate that Congress and the Supreme Court are on convergent
courses concerning privacy of communication. Although
constitutional obstacles to authorized wiretapping have not been
completely resolved, these recent developments augur well for a
definite and salutary treatment of the controversial wiretap subject.
388 U.S. at 60.
"389 U.S. at 356. See also New York Eavesdropping Warrants Law, 1968 MCKiNNEY'S
SESSION LAW NEWS, ch. 546; ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 206-36 (1968) (tentative draft).
"18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1513).
"18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1523); cf. United States v.
Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1964).
11 See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 122 (1941); cf. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471,491-92 (1963). But see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260-67 (1960). See
also Mancusiv. De Forte, U.S. , (1968).
52 364 U.S. at 222-24. See note 28 supra.
"392 U.S. at 385-86.
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